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BACKGROUND NOTE
Following is the text of an
of the European Communities, the Right
lrOpinion, Pariseon 6 October 1978.
t have chosen as a title t'Prospects for the European Communit.y". I
did so because I believe that the_ Community has reached a stage in lts development
- 
I will not say it is the first 
- 
when either its future could more than fulfil
the aspirations of its founders, or - and it is a real danger - go seriously
wrong. It would, I thought, be usetul it I spoke today of the three major issues
which have it in them, as it were, to make or break the Community.
The first is the challenge presented by direct elections to the European
Parliament in June 1979, In my own countryr and indeed in yours, there has been
a certain amount of misgiving about these elections, in some cases amounting to
outright opposition. In some respecEs opposition from the enemies of the European
idea is easier to understand than the misgivings of Ehose who in other erays support
Europe and the development of the Conrnunity. For the founding fathers of Europe alwqys
inte;ded.that the European Parliament should be elected directly by the people
of the Conrnunity. In Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome it is clearly and
unambiguously stated that 'rthe assembly shaI1 draw up proposals for elecEions
by direct universal suffragert. It has taken us a long time to honour a commitment
accepted by all our countries, all our governments, all our parliaments, when
they ratified the Treaty of Rome.
This is not of course the only reason for holding direct elections.
For in my judgment, lf Article 138 of the Treaty did not exist, it would be
necessary to lnvent it. There ls an overwhelming philosophical as well as
practical case for hol-ding direct elections to the Parliament of the Cornrnunity.
The Conununity's means are largely economic but its performance is and always
has been political. It is founded solidl"y on the principles of representative
democracy. These principles were directl-y reaffirmed in the declaration on
democracy made by the nine Heads of State and Government after the European
Council at Copenhagen on 7 and 8 April this year. The Heads of State and
Government then said - I quote - that rtrespect for and maintenance of represen-
tative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential elements
,f membership of the European Communities'r. To this I add that what is right for
each Member State is also right for the Community itself.
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An essentlal element of such democracy ls that those who make decisions
should be subject to effectlve scrutiny and control by the representatives of
those ln whose name the decisions are made. Already a wlde range of declsions,
with inunense effects for good or ill on the fortunes of our 26O mlllion citizens,
are taken at the Community rather than at the natlonal levet. If the Community
is to develop, more lmportant decislons will be taken at the Cormnunity level in
the future than ln the past. National parliaments already scrutinize and control
the activities of their national governments within the Conununlty and to some
extent the activities of the Conrnunity itself. But it is simply not possible to
scrutinlze and control the whole complex of Comrnunity decision making at nine
national levels. Natlonal parliaments, etected on national issues, and responsible
to national constituents, have a natLonal job to do. To ask them to do a thorough
Community job as well, and to coordinate their efforts, is to ask for the
impossible, and the impossible ls not made possible by giving the job to an
unllected and necessarity part-time European Parliament instead. In my judgment
Conrmunity decisions and Communlty decislon makers can be effectively scrutinized
and controlled only by a Cornrnunity Parliament, elected by Community constituents
to carry out CommunitY tasks.
Such a Conrnunity Parliament could scarcely hope to carry out those
rasks if ir did not have the legltimacy which only direct etections can give.
In all the Member States there ls a measure of resentment against the bureaucrats
of Brussels, remote and mostly anon)rmous figures who appear to take insensitive
and unaccountable decisions affectlng people's daily 1ives, and who all too
easily become the symbol of that fussy over-government of which everyone has
had enough. If the Community is to move forward, then the ordinary citizen must
feel thai his voice can be heard in Brussels as in hls own capital. The issues
which are decided there must be made more real to him and the means by which
they are decided more clear. I do not think that a nominated Parllament could
achieve these purposes. A directly elected Parllament might - I say rnight - be
able to do so.
It ls not of course certain that lt w111. I said at the beginning of
this as of other issues that thlngs could go seriously wrong. The future directly
elected Parllament wl11 not have more constitutlonal powers than the Present
indirectly elected one. It wlll not, ltke a national parliamentr be called upon
to providl or sustaln a government. Its role will ber as I have said' to scrutinize
and control and in doing so to reflect the views of European publlc oplnion on
Conrnunity rather than natlonal lssues. Let us consider what may happen. I begin
with what ls, I think, the flattest hypothesis. That would be a Parllament whlah
accepted too readily the vlew of natlonal governments and behind them natlonal
parliamengs on matters of CormrunLty concern, and fbiled fully to Protect the
cortrnon European interest, and to exercise the powers wlth which it is endowed.
An6ther hypothesis, whlch I know has been widely discussed ln this country, is
that the Parliament will rapidly enter into conflict tith national governments
and parllaments, and other Conrnunity institutlons as wel1, by seeking to give
itself porrers not provlded fcir in the Treaty. Such an attemPt would provide the
material for constitutional confllct of the kind which, for good or ill r rnost
of our contrLes have sometimes known in the Past. A third and, I hopermore
plauslble hypothesls ls that the new Parliament, reinforced with the moral
authority oi dlrect electlons, w111 use the poters it has more futly and
establlsh that more even retationshlp with the other Conrnunity instltutions
which was the original intention.
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This will of course require some change in the attitude not only of the
institutlon over which I preside but also of the Council in which the national
governments are represented. There wl11 have to be more respect for the European
Parliament, more notice taken of lts views, a greater effort of explanation. In
short all must recognize that the new Parliament must play a bigger role in the
Conrmunity processes than the existing Parliament. In the coming campaign the
electorate wiLl be given the opportunity to pronounce on the major issues faci4g
the Community. If the Parliament they elect, and the other Community institutions,
fail to take account of the result, Ehem we shall indeed be making a mockery
of the dernocratic processes we have set in train. Members of Parliament are not
elected Eo be poodles of an executlve. Their job is to be the watchdogs of the
people. Watchdogs are not much use if they are never allowed to bite.
To glve the Parliament its due place in the institutions of our Community
is not to unmake our national parliaments any more than the establishment of the
Council was to unmake our national governments. The long postponed honouring of
our commitments under the Treat,y to create a Parliament of the same stature as
the other institutlons should enhance rather than diminish the richness and
diversity of Europe. It if fails to do so, we shall all be the losers and we
shaIl all carry a share in the responsibility for failure.
Enlargement of the European Communitv
The second of the three great issues to which I have referred is superficially
unco4nected with the first; but in a deeper sense it. is closely related to it. It is
the challenge of the Conrnunityts ordn enlargement. Three new democracies in Southern
Europe have applled for membership. They have done so partly because they wish,
quite legitimately, to share in the economic advantages which the Community can
iive them. But their motives are not primarily economic, any more Ehan were the
lotLves of those who founded the Conrnunity. They are seeking membership because
for them, as for us, the Community represents a gathering in of European civill-
zation wlth its corrnitments to representative democracy and human rights. They
are animated by the same ideals as lie behind the decision to hold direct elecEions
to the European Parliament.
It would be easy to say that Greece, Portugal and Spain are far away and
should be able to look after themselves. Such a view would, in my opinion, be
profoundly mistaken. Greece, Portught and Spain are all entitled to join the
Conrmunity. A11 have made contributions to European civilization which can be
comparedrto say the least, with those made by existing Member States. To reject
European countrles entitled and qualified to join would not only be a betrayal
of the Treaty, which. ls the foundation of the Community, but also make a mockery
of the underlylng princlples to which the Community is dedicated.
This ls not to deny that. enlargement will create major problems for
us all. But let us be honest with ourselves. We have a habit of talking about the
relative poverty cif some of the applicant countries and of the difficulties
which acceptance of the common Community disciplines would create for them; and
I think lve recognize that in bringing them into the Community we shall have to
give help to those, ln particular Portugal, who need it. But concern for the
applicant countries is sometimes a mask for greater concern for ourselves and
particular interests which might or might not be threatened. On this I recall
what I said earlier: in our Community we are not either losers or gainers,
according to some narrow profits and loss account. We all gain. I remember
rht ln the late 1950s many Frenchmen feared that French industry iould not
possibly stand up to German competition, and opposed French membership
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of the Conrmunity on that account. In the event French industry benefited at least
as much as German industry from the lo*ering of taritt barriers and the increase
'of trade shich followed. Adaptation was necessary and Eook place, and the resutt
was eventually good tor all. I see no reason why current fears of competit,ion in
the industrlal or agricultural flelds from the appticant cguntries should be any
more soundly based. On Lhe lndustrlal side the etfects of Greek, Portugue'se and
Spanlsh membership could be to contribute that stimulus to our economies which
we all badly leed; and on the agricuttural side their membershlp will coincide
with necessary and overdue changes in the balance of the Common Agricultural
Policy between north and south, designed to bring more sense and greater equity
tnto our system as a whole. The economic problems are real but they can be ov€ECoo€.
More serious are the problems which enlargement will create for our
institrltions. Presldent Glscard drEsialng recently drew attention to them in a
letter which he sent to the eight other Heads of Governnent and to myself calling
for a study by a group of three wlse people. This is an interesting idea which
merits careful examinatlon wit,hin the Connrunity. Some time ago the Comnission Put
forward proposals on how to solve some of the very real problems to which President
Giscard has altuded. I remark only that in the discusslons whlch have taken place
in the Councitr Member States have shown Ehemselves to be a good deal more conser-
vative than the Commisslon. I{e shall naturally be pursuing our own work on the
subJect and will count on making our contribution to whatever solution of t.hese
problems the Conrmunity arrives at.
Enlargement carries many perils. If it failed, it could have incalculabf,e
effects on the future of Greece, Portugal and Spain, and not least ourselves. If
it succeeded without accompanying measures to strengthen our institutions, it
coutd damage the functloning'of the Corrnunity, in particular its decision making
prociss, and over tlme cause a creeplng paralysis and loss of will which couLd
lead to a gradual dislntegratlon.'On the other hand it could bring about
relnforcement of our lnstitutlons and stimu lete economic growth and necessary
change, and advance the evolution of the Community in aecordance with the purposes
of the Treaty. The result is far from certain. None of the existing members of
the Community, nor for that aatter eny of the applicant countries themselves,
wants the Community to be weakened as a result of entargement. Let us make sure
that we rise as we should to the challenge.
A zone of monet:arv st,abilitv
The third maJor issue to whlch I refer today is our ability to move
through the creatlon of a zone of monetary stability towards our old objective
of economic and monetary unlon. Before this audience I hardly need to sEate the
arguments new and old for proceedlng ln this direction. I have set them out many
times, and most fully ln a speech I made in Florence almost a year ago. Since
then the sltuatlon has been t.ransformed. The progress which has been made has
exceeded by best expectations at the time.
Perhaps I should single out two main reasons for this change of mind.
the flrst was that lt became more generally understood that the movement of
different European currencles agalnst each other made nonsense of the '.totion of
a real Community and negated many of the benefits which should have flowed from
the creation of a Corrnon Market. Floating exchange rates painfully affected the
ability of national governments to run their own economles.Those in surplus
found that the decline in demand from countries ln deficit rebounded on their
own growth rates; while those in deficit were frustrated in their efforts to
achieve higher growth by constant exch.nge rate crises.
(
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Hence the relatlvely poor product,lvity of Europe, the relatively poor rate of
growth and the relatively high rate of unemployment, all ln contrast with theprevlous decades of reasonable monetary stabillty.
The second major factor has been the condurrent decline in the value
of the US dollar. The Euro-peans have done more than ls always realized in the
Unlted States to maintaln the value of the d611ar and to hold more dollars in
their natlonal treasurlea than they want or need. This has had drastic effects
on the ablllty of Europearr governments to controt thelr own money supply. As I
said in a letter to the nine Heads of State and Government last March: 'tTherels a fundamental asyrtretry about the United States having withdrawn from the
responslbllitl.es of Bretton Woods, while dol1ars, like legions without a
central conrmand, contlnue to dominate the currency transact.ions of the worldtl.
Since the Copenhagen meetlng of the European Council events have
moved fast, thanks in large measure to the eftorts of Chancellor Schmidt and
President Giscard drEstalng. The degree of understanding reached at the European
Council at Bremen astonished the world and lald the basis for the determined
work which is under way. We must hope that the deadllnes laid down at Bremen
w111 be respected and that the European Council at Brussels ln December will I
apProve the creation of a European Monetary System to come into being on
1 January next year. The creatLon of such a system w111 not of course be the
same as a European economic and monetary union, but it will be a giant st.rlde
towards it. In such a system Iles the best hope of Ehis generatlon of Europeans.
Its possibilltles tor growth are llmitless; and its creation could prove a
decisive event in the evolution of the Conrnunity.
But here again the dangers are very real. Failure now would put us
back a long way, and have psychological effects on our ability to work together.
or wbuld a partial result, lnvolvlng only some members of the Conununity, be
in the cormlon lnterest. A two-speed Europe, or perhaps even a three-speed Europe
when the Conrmunity is enlarged, could have profoundly disruptive etfects. The
very sense of a Conrmunity would be lmperilled. Our Communlty involves common
disclplines, cotmon sense. of responsibility, common understanding and common
partlcipatlon. A European Monetary System must clearly be to the benefit of all
and take account of the circumstances of all. Thus responsibiltty for failure
would rest not only with those who felt unable to come along but wlth those who
avoldably made it difficult for all to come along.
In conclusion tet me repeat my central theme. The Community has it ln
its power to achleve more progress than has been possible for at least a generation.
The electlon of t.he directly elected Parliament, the further enlargement of the
Coruaunity and the creation of a European Monetary System could prove the most
fertile combinatlon of events for the future of our Conrnunity since the signature
of the Treaty of Rome. But there ls another side to the coin. If we fail to meet
the challenge which each presents to us, we shall certainly be worse off in all
respects, and l{estern Europe would enter a time of troubles such as we have
not known since the war. To remain as we are is not a genuine al.ternative. We
move forward together or rre move backwards apart.
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